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Despite the frequent references to Schumpeter’s work, his own encompassing methodological approach as worked out 
by Shionoya (1997) has hardly been considered. In this paper, it is revisited together with Georgescu-Roegen’s 
contributions to economic methodology in view of (i) their contribution to the foundations of an evolutionary analysis 
in economics and (ii) their mutual complementarity and differences. Both are centred around the issue of qualitative 
change and its substantial analysis. Schumpeter’s analytical distinction between the levels of subject matter and method 
and his further distinction between stationary and evolutionary economy on the level of subject matter are shown to be 
decisive for the structure of his analytical system and the determination of an evolutionary analysis on its basis. It is 
further shown that Georgescu-Roegen’s contributions – his evaluation of the entropy law and his consideration of the 
implications of qualitative change for economic analysis – follow exactly the general structure of Schumpeter’s 
analytical system which they refine or correct. It is argued that they provided together an encompassing general 
framework for the analysis of economic evolution necessarily different from, but complementary to modern static and 
dynamic analysis. However, they did neither state nor solve the general theoretical problem of an evolutionary analysis 
in their sense. 
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1  Introduction 
Methodological  debate  has  been  accompanying  modern  evolutionary  economics  since  its 
inception with Nelson and Winter (1982). While there has been much concern e.g. with the 
relevance  and  applicability  of  biological  analogy,  in  particular  of  (neo-)darwinism  and 
darwinian  concepts,  and  with  the  self-organization  approach,
1  Schumpeter’s  own 
encompassing methodological approach, as treated most directly in chapter two of his History 
of Economic Analysis (1954) and worked out for his work as a whole only by Shionoya 
(1997),  has  hardly  been  discussed  as  such.  Interestingly,  the  same  applies  to  his  pupil’s 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1906-94) methodological contributions.  
The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the debate on the analytical foundations of 
the evolutionary approach to economics by a joint evaluation of contributions of these two 
major  precursors.  Therefore,  Schumpeter’s  approach  to  economic  analysis  is  revisited 
together with some of Georgescu-Roegen’s fundamental contributions on the issue in view of 
(i) their contribution to the foundations of an evolutionary analysis in economics and (ii) their 
mutual complementarity and differences. Their special concern was for qualitative change as 
the basic feature of (economic) evolution and its substantial analysis. Schumpeter developed 
an encompassing analytical system which was to integrate equilibrium economics and the 
analysis  of  economic  evolution.  Georgescu-Roegen,  by  contrast,  focused  on  many  single, 
rather  technical  points.  In  the  literature,  the  close  relationship  between  Schumpeter’s  and 
Georgescu-Roegen’s works has often been emphasized. However, a detailed examination and 
evaluation of their interrelation has never been carried out.
2 
In this paper, in order to compare Schumpeter’s analytical system with the modern analytical 
categories as well as Georgescu-Roegen’s approach, first the general structure of his system 
and  the  position  and  importance  of  qualitative  change  in  it  are  worked  out.  His  decisive 
analytical distinction between the levels of subject matter and method is pointed out. On the 
basis of his distinction of the stationary and the evolutionary economy on the level of subject 
matter a stationary and an evolutionary part of his system are distinguished. It is shown that 
modern statics and dynamics, including the comparative-analytic approaches, do neither fit in 
this  distinction  nor  fully  cover  its  scope.  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  an  evolutionary 
analysis in the narrower and the wider sense are defined encompassing its further parts or the 
whole of his analytical system, respectively.  
                                                            
1 For a number of more recent contributions, cf. e.g. Dopfer et al. (2004), Foster (1997, 2000), Hodgson (2002, 
2004), Knudsen (2002, 2004), Lehmann-Waffenschmidt (2002), Saviotti (1996), and Witt (1997, 2004). 
2  This  seems  surprising  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Schumpeter  intended  to  write  the  ‘definitive  treatise’  on 
economics  with  Georgescu-Roegen  (e.g.  Samuelson  1966),  which  was  never  realized,  and  that  Georgescu-
Roegen (1992: 30) assumed himself to be “the only true Schumpeterian.”  
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It is then shown that many of Georgescu-Roegen’s contributions – especially his evaluation of 
the entropy law and his consideration of the implications of qualitative change for economic 
analysis – can be seen as direct critical complementary elaborations on the evolutionary part 
of Schumpeter’s analytical system. They contribute to it both on the level of subject matter 
and  of  method.  In  fact,  while  Schumpeter  met  many  of  his  methodical  claims  on  rather 
intuitive  grounds,  Georgescu-Roegen  tried  to  give  them  substance  with  scientific  or 
philosophical argument.  
In  a  synopsis  of  their  contributions,  it  is  argued  that  together  they  did  provide  an 
encompassing general framework for the analysis of economic evolution necessarily different 
from,  but  complementary  to  modern  static  and  dynamic  analysis.  The  discussion  shows, 
however, furthermore that they did neither state nor solve the general theoretical problem of 
an evolutionary analysis in their sense. In a brief outlook on modern research finally the close 
relationship of their approach to the modern is pointed out. Some problems still present in 
modern research are stated. 
Their contributions are mostly reviewed with regard to their original works. The reading of 
Schumpeter  largely  follows  Shionoya  (1997),  but  prefers  to  use  in  contrast  to  Shionoya 
Schumpeter’s later more clarified terminology and categories. More recently, Freeman and 
Louça  (2001:  ch.  2)  have  discussed  Schumpeter’s  approach  in  the  context  of  long-wave 
research. However, they do not mention Shionoya and, like Shionoya, neither Georgescu-
Roegen at all. In the literature on Georgescu-Roegen, the close relationship between the two 
authors has often been pointed out (e.g. Beard and Lozada 1999, Mesner and Gowdy 1999, 
Samuelson 1966). But also the seminal book on his work, Beard and Lozada (1999), mentions 
Schumpeter only as an influential teacher of his.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces Schumpeter’s analytical system and 
determines what could be considered as an evolutionary analysis in the narrower and the 
wider sense in his sense. Some difficulties of his approach are pointed out. Section 3 reviews 
Georgescu-Roegen’s contribution to an evolutionary methodology and shows inhowfar many 
aspects  he  treated  directly  respond  to  the  difficulties  in  Schumpeter’s  work.  It  briefly 
considers  furthermore  how  he  went  beyond  the  scope  of  his  teacher’s  analysis  in  his 
bioeconomics.  Section  4  provides  a  synopsis  of  Schumpeter’s  and  Georgescu-Roegen’s 
contributions to the foundations of an evolutionary analysis discussing their relationship to 
neoclassical  equilibrium  economics,  mutual  complementarities  and  differences  of  their 
methodologies, as well as their joint contribution. Section 5 relates the findings of the present 
paper to current research and states some general implications and tasks deriving from them. 
Section 6 concludes.  
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2  Qualitative change as the central analytical issue of an evolutionary analysis 
In this section, Schumpeter’s analytical system is reconsidered in view of its contribution to 
the foundations of an evolutionary analysis in economics. Section 2.1 restates his analytical 
approach. The central importance and position of qualitative change in it are worked out.
3 
Section 2.2 distinguishes between a stationary and an evolutionary part of his system and 
describes what could be considered as an evolutionary analysis in his sense. Section 2.3 states 
three unsettled issues of his methodology to which Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology later 
referred.  
 
2.1 The importance of qualitative change in Schumpeter’s analytical system 
As Schumpeter’s analytical system constitutes the basic reference for the argument of this 
paper, its structure is presented in the following in some detail paying special attention to his 
original notions and terminology. 
  
2.1.1 Basic characteristics of Schumpeter’s analytical approach 
A main intention of Schumpeter’s was to integrate in his work the concerns and perspectives 
of  a  wide  range  of  contemporary  economic  approaches  into  one  encompassing  analytical 
scheme resting on a coherent methodological basis.
4 For this to be possible he developed a 
methodological  approach  with  a  series  of  special  traits.  Before  the  basic  structure  of  his 
analytical system is briefly outlined, four particular traits shall be stressed.
5  
First,  Schumpeter’s  approach  starts  from  a  fundamental  analytical  separation  between  the 
subject matter under consideration and the methods to be applied for its analysis. This goes, 
second, together with a pervasive concern for the correspondence between decisive features of 
the nature of the subject matter under study and the methods used for analysis. Third, on the 
level of subject matter, in accord with his integrative claim, Schumpeter held a holistic view 
with the social process as the general starting point for economic analysis perceived as an 
“indivisible  whole”  (“einheitliche  Erscheinung”)  (Schumpeter  1934:  3,  1912/1926a:  1). 
Fourth, on the level of method, he persued an instrumentalist stance (Shionoya 1997: 104-
                                                            
3 The importance of qualitative change in Schumpeter’s analytical approach is well known. The intention is here, 
for the purposes of the present paper, to determine particularly closely its position in and, related to that, its 
importance for his analytical system. 
4 Shionoya (1997) describes, with reference to an article on Schmoller (Schumpeter 1926b), as Schumpeter’s 
overarching goal the creation of a ‘universal social science.’ The economic schools of which Schumpeter took 
notice, all of which he judged, at least in principle, as valid in their own right, comprised, to remind, the Austrian 
school, the younger and the youngest German historical school, Walrasian equilibrium economics and the early 
mathematical economics, Marxian sociology as well as the upcoming statistical, or econometric, approach. 
5 Schumpeter did not state these traits as such. However, they can be inferred from his work in connection with 
Shionoya (1997) as well as Georgescu-Roegen’s elaborations on it.  
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108),  according  to  which  the  different  methods  at  the  economist’s  hand  are  viewed  as 
analytical tools to be appropriately applied with respect to the respective subject matter, or 
question, under study.  
More  concretely,  Schumpeter  considered  economic  analysis  as  composed  of  the  three 
research areas of statics, dynamics, and economic sociology, which are to study, on the level 
of subject matter, respectively, the static state of the economy, economic development, and 
the economic process as a part of the larger sociocultural development.
6 Apart from that, 
Schumpeter (1954: ch.  2) identified on the level of subject matter the four techniques of 
theory, history, statistics, and economic sociology (or institutional analysis)
7 to analyse the 
objects of the three basic areas of economic research. Of these, only theory is to be applied in 
all three areas. The other three are applied, in different ways, only in dynamics and economic 
sociology.  The  assignment  of  these  techniques  in  the  different  research  areas  will  be 
considered below. 
 
2.1.2 A note on terminology 
For the present text it is of importance to note that Schumpeter’s use of certain terms, such as 
statics, dynamics as well as the designation and notion of the subject matter of his economic 
analysis, evolved or varied over his work. While his early notion of statics largely comprised 
both modern statics and dynamics, dynamics in his early sense was tantamount to his theory 
of economic development which goes beyond modern dynamics.
8 Schumpeter later adopted 
the modern terminology (e.g. Schumpeter 1950: 104n, 1954: 963-965, 1160-1161). Moreover, 
over the decades Schumpeter used different words to address his subject matter. While he 
concentrated in his early work on ‘economic development’ viewed as one element of the 
larger ‘sociocultural development,’ he later studied the ‘capitalist process,’ or, neutrally, the 
‘economic process’ or ‘economic  evolution.’ While Shionoya in developing his  argument 
                                                            
6 Cf. Shionoya (1997: 31-53, 71). The fields and their analytical objects will be further explained below. In the 
case  of  the  subject  matter  of  economic  sociology,  the  terminology  has  been  slightly  adapted  according  to 
Schumpeter’s later usage. Schumpeter identified economic development with domain-specific evolution in the 
economic field. He assumed that similar development phenomena could be described for other social fields such 
as politics, culture, science, or religion. His notion of sociocultural development then meant the aggregate of the 
domain-specific evolutions in the different fields considered with their mutual interrelationships. 
7 As an analytical technique, economic sociology largely corresponds to institutional analysis (Schumpeter 1954: 
21, Shionoya 1997: 48-50); as a research area, it may roughly be equated to sociological research on economic 
matters. Particularly due to Schumpeter’s premature death, the concept and its place in his analytical system 
remained  ultimately  unclarified.  Shionoya  (1997)  shows  the  important  role  economic  sociology  plays  in 
Schumpeter’s  work  and  his  analytical  system.  For  a  clear  distinction  beween  research  area  and  economic 
technique, the term will be substituted in the following on the level of technique, in contrast to Schumpeter’s 
original choice of word, by institutional analysis. 
8 Both will be explained below.  
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conciously mostly sticks to Schumpeter’s early choice of words (Shionoya 1997: 316-317), in 
the present paper generally Schumpeter’s later, more clarified terminology will be used. 
 
2.1.3 The position and importance of qualitative change in Schumpeter’s analytical system 
In order to determine the position, and importance, of qualitative change in Schumpeter’s 
analytical system, it is first briefly indicated how its structure sketched above applies to the 
sequence  of  his  four  major  books  contributing  to  actual  economic  analysis.
9  Then  some 
crucial places of his work are revisited.  
Schumpeter started to contribute to economics by treating economic statics in his first book 
Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie (1908), briefly restated 
in chapter one of his second major book Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1912). 
Motivated by the insufficiency of statics to explain economic development, he investigated 
the  latter  phenomenon,  on  theoretical  level,  in  chapters  two  to  six  of  Entwicklung. 
Subsequently, he broadened his analytical perspective and attempted, apart from his deepened 
interest in economic sociology during that time, to give empirical support to his analysis of 
economic development via history and statistics. With Business Cycles (1939) he delivered, as 
its  subtitle  indicates,  a  “Theoretical,  Historical  and  Statistical  Analysis  of  the  Capitalist 
Process.” While the later omitted chapter 7 of the first edition of Entwicklung can be seen as 
an application of theory in the area of economic sociology, he finally showed in Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (1942) how the elements of theory and history supplemented by an 
institutional analysis can be combined in one work in economic sociology.  
What  is  the  position  of  qualitative  change  in  his  analytical  system?  The  following  two 
quotations from Entwicklung give hints towards an answer. In the first one Schumpeter states 
the  problem  of  his  theory  of  economic  development,  in  the  second  one  he  treats  the 
relationship between development and equilibrium.
10 
 
Our  problem  is  as  follows.  The  theory  of  the  first  chapter  describes  economic  life  from  the  standpoint  of 
“circular flow,” running on in channels essentially the same year after year – similar to the circulation of blood 
in an animal organism. Now this circular flow and its channels do not alter in time and here we abandon the 
analogy with the circulation of the blood. For although the latter also changes in the course of the growth and 
decline of the organism, yet it only does so continuously […] Economic life experiences such changes too, but it 
also experiences others  which do not appear continuously and which change the framework, the traditional 
course itself [for example, such changes as from a mail coach to a railway (Shionoya 1997: 321)]. They cannot 
be understood by means of any analysis of the circular flow, although they are purely economic and although 
their explanation is obviously among the tasks of pure theory. Now such changes and the phenomena which 
appear in their train are the object of our investigation.  (Schumpeter 1934: 61-62) 
                                                            
9 For the present purposes, it is sufficient to only refer to them. For a full account of Schumpeter’s work, see 
Shionoya (1997). 
10 It is not of importance at this place that the first quote is taken from the English edition of Entwicklung (1934) 
and  the  second  one  from  the  original  German  edition  (1912,  chapter  7).  On  the  intricacies  surrounding 
Schumpeter’s work, its interpretation and reception, see, however, Shionoya (2004).  
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It follows from our entire thought that a dynamic equilibrium does not exist. Development in its ultimate nature 
disturbs  an  existing  static  equilibrium  and  does  not  have  a  tendency  to  return  to  a  previous  or  any  other 
equilibrium. Development alters the data of a static economy […] Development and equilibrium are opposite 
phenomena  excluding  each  other.  Not  that  a  static  economy  is  characterized  by  a  static  equilibrium  and  a 
dynamic economy by a dynamic equilibrium; on the contrary, equilibrium only exists in a static economy. 
Economic equilibrium is essentially a static equilibrium.  (Schumpeter 1912: 489, as quoted in Shionoya 1997: 
39) 
 
While an equilibrium can only be defined for a static economy, i.e. an economy in which all 
economic processes essentially remain the same year after year changing if at all only in size, 
hence quantitatively, development breaks out from the static framework by ‘altering the data 
of a static economy’ and changing the ‘traditional economic course.’ Accordingly, the main 
task of a theory of economic development is to explain the changes of the latter kind. With 
regard to qualitative change, it is evident that it constitutes, in fact, the essential feature of 
economic development. So, the theoretical task could also be stated, more generally, as to 
explain  qualitative  change  in  the  economy.  It  occurs  furthermore  from  the  quotes  that 
Schumpeter’s statics, in his early sense, though referring to the equilibrium concept exceeds 
modern statics by its possible temporal interpretation. In modern terms, his early statics could 
therefore roughly be equated to a combination of modern statics and dynamics. Similarly, 
dynamics in Schumpeter’s early sense, i.e. his development theory, being explicitly concerned 
with  equilibrium-destroying  forces,  exceeds  modern  dynamics,  as  developed  e.g.  by 
Samuelson  (1947)  or  Baumol  (1970),  which,  like  modern  statics,  also  centres  around  the 
equilibrium  concept.  It  is  hence  especially  by  its  focus  on  the  explanation  of  qualitative 
change  that  his  development  theory  goes  beyond  modern  dynamic  theory.  Therefore 
Schumpeter’s claim for analytical inclusion of qualitative change, in particular in terms of 
technological innovation, formulated in his theory of economic development can be seen as a 
decisive step beyond neoclassical equilibrium theory. 
As  regards  the  empirical  importance  of  qualitative  change,  in  his  early  theorizing  his 
considerations remained restricted to a statement of existence. Neither had he exposed the 
notions of evolution and evolutionary yet. Subsequently Schumpeter broadened his analytical 




The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process. [… It] 
is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary. And this 
evolutionary character of the capitalist process is not merely due to the fact that economic life goes on in a social 
and natural environment which changes and by its change alters the data of economic action […]. Nor is [… it] 
due to a quasi-automatic increase in population and capital or to the vagaries of monetary systems […]. The 
                                                            
11 Schumpeter had exposed the notion of evolution at length in Business Cycles (1939: ch. 3-4). The following 
quote captures his idea, however, in a particularly illustrative way.  
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fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, 
the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that 
capitalist enterprise creates.  
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the contents of the laborer’s budget, say from 1760 to 1940, did not 
simply grow on unchanging lines but they underwent a process of qualitative change. […] So is the history […] 
of transportation from the mailcoach to the airplane. The opening up of new markets […] and the organizational 
development from the craft shop […] to such concerns as U. S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial 
mutation – if one may use that biological term – that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within [emphasis in orig.], incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of 
Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.  (Schumpeter 1950: 82-83, emphasis added) 
 
With his notion of creative destruction as the ‘essential fact of capitalism’ Schumpeter now 
fixes the occurrence of qualitative change as a general and necessary trait to the nature of the 
capitalist  process,  which  he  designates,  due  to  that,  as  “evolutionary”  in  character.  He 
describes  the  evolutionary  character  as  a  consequence  of  the  changing  social  and  natural 
environment, but more importantly of the introduction of new elements as its main driving 
force.  Its  characterizing  feature  is  qualitative  change  coming  ‘from  within’  the  economy. 
Hence,  the  evolutionary  exceeds  the  stationary  economy  by  the  occurrence  of  qualitative 
change.  
In History of Economic Analysis (1954), Schumpeter usually speaks more neutrally of the 
economic process. He attaches to it equivalent traits as to the capitalist process in Capitalism, 
but particularly stresses its historic and, therefore, unique nature.
12 He precises his notion of 
evolution by distinguishing a wider and a narrower sense: 
 
In the wider sense [evolution] comprises all the phenomena that make an economic process non-stationary. In 
the narrower sense it comprises these phenomena minus those that maybe described in terms of continuous 
variations of rates within an unchanging framework of institutions, tastes, or technological horizons, and will be 
included in the concept of growth.  (Schumpeter 1954: 964) 
 
With regard to the importance and position of qualitative change in Schumpeter’s analytical 
system it can thus be summarized that, on the level of subject matter, qualitative change is the 
decisive element of the phenomenon of economic development, the characteristic element of 
the capitalist process, and a typical one of the (real) economic process. It characteristically 
distinguishes the evolutionary from the stationary economy and constitutes the main defining 
characteristic  of  evolution.  On  theoretical  level,  it  constitutes  the  decisive  element,  and 




                                                            
12 He states e.g.: “[T]he subject matter of economics is essentially a unique process in historic time” (Schumpeter 
1954: 12), or speaks of the “historical or ‘evolutionary’ nature of the economic process” (ibid., p. 34).   
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2.1.4  Modern  statics  and  dynamics  and  the  assignment  of  analytical  techniques  in 
Schumpeter’s analytical system 
With respect to the four techniques of theory, history, statistics, and institutional analysis it 
was stated above that theory is to be applied in all of Schumpeter’s three research areas, but 
that it constitutes the only one to be appropriately applied in his statics. It was left open how 
the  three  others  are  to  be  used  in  his  dynamics  and  economic  sociology.  In  view  of  the 
evaluation  of  Schumpeter’s  approach  from  a  modern  perspective,  given  the  centrality  of 
qualitative change in his analytical system, it shall now first be asked which role he saw for 
modern statics and dynamics for an analysis in its presence. It is then considered how he 
proposed to cope with it else.  
On the first question, Schumpeter expresses his basic position in Capitalism in a footnote:
13 
 
It should be observed that the defining feature of dynamic theory has nothing to do with the nature of the 
economic reality to which it is applied. It is a general method of analysis rather than a study of a particular 
process. We can use it in order to analyse the stationary economy, just as an evolving one can be analysed by the 
means of statics (“comparative statics”). Hence dynamic theory need not take, and as a matter of fact has not 
taken, any special cognizance of the process of creative destruction which we have taken to be the essence of 
capitalism. It is no doubt better equipped than is static theory to deal with many questions of mechanism that 
arise in the analysis of that process. But it is not an analysis of that process itself, and it treats the resulting 
individual disturbances of given states and structures just as it treats other disturbances. (Schumpeter 1950: 
104n) 
 
Modern  statics  and  dynamics  being  particularly  suited  for  the  stationary  economy,  he 
concedes that (modern) dynamic theory is ‘better equipped’ than static theory for the analysis 
of ‘many questions of mechanism’ of the capitalist process, and that aspects of an evolving 
economy can be taken into account by a comparative-static approach. They could not analyse, 
however, the ‘process itself’ with its evolutionary nature.  
What does Schumpeter’s system provide for coping with the ‘process itself’? Obviously, his 
areas  of  dynamics  and  economic  sociology  essentially  deal  with  the  evolving  economy. 
Reviewing the use of the four techniques, Shionoya (1997: 43-51) identifies statistics as a 
supplementary  method  to  history  for  development  theory,  and  institutional  analysis  as  a 
supplementary method to history for economic sociology. He also wonders about the role of 
mathematics  in  Schumpeter’s  system  and  describes  that  it  could  be  introduced  as  a  fifth 
technique  and  regarded  as  a  supplementary  method  to  theory.  Assigning  the  techniques, 
according  to  Schumpeter  (1954:  ch.  2,  Shionoya  1997:  49),  the  analysis  of  economic 
development  requires  then  theory  and  history  supplemented  by  statistics.  For  the  area  of 
economic sociology he regarded theory and history supplemented by an institutional analysis 
as appropriate.  
                                                            
13 The issue is treated at length in Schumpeter (1954: 963-971, 1160-1161).  
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Schumpeter’s  analytical  system,  including  the  assignment  of  analytical  techniques,  or 
methods, can be summarized as follows. 
 
Research area  Subject matter  Methods 
statics  static/stationary state  theory 




economic process as a part of 
the larger sociocultural 
development 
theory, history supplemented by 
institutional analysis 
Table 1: Schumpeter’s analytical system as described in the text. 
 
From a modern perspective, as compared to the now usual classification of methods, it is 
interesting  to  note  that  neither  Schumpeter  nor  Shionoya  use  the  term  empirical,  or 
descriptive, for the three techniques of history, statistics and institutional analysis, by which 
they could be contrasted together to theory. Following the preceding presentation, it could 
thus be stated in sum that Schumpeter regarded these empirical methods as specially suited 
for the analysis of the ‘process itself.’ Apparently, this goes together with a reduced role for 
theory and, hence, mathematics in the areas of dynamics and economic sociology. It is further 
to be remarked that in modern statics and dynamics the, usually mathematical, theory has now 
econometrics as its empirical complement. 
 
2.2 Evolutionary analysis according to Schumpeter – a tentative modern reclassification 
What can be considered as an ‘evolutonary analysis’ in Schumpeter’s sense? For the sake of 
the  argument  of  this  paper,  in  this  section  Schumpeter’s  analytical  categories  shall  be 
tentatively reclassified distinguishing first, more broadly, an evolutionary from a stationary 
part of his analytical system and then defining evolutionary analysis in the narrower and the 
wider sense.
14  
For the further discussion and, in particular, for a better comparison of Schumpeter’s and 
Georgescu-Roegen’s methodologies, it seems to be useful to divide Schumpeter’s analytical 
system more broadly into a stationary and an evolutionary part. The stationary part shall be 
defined as that part which is concerned with the stationary economy, the evolutionary part as 
that  part  which  analyses  the  evolving  economy.  The  distinction  of  the two  parts  exceeds 
                                                            
14 Beyond the scope of this paper, the distinction of an evolutionary analysis in the narrower and the wider sense 
may  be  considered  as  a  terminological  suggestion  in  the  ongoing  debate  on  analytical  foundations  of  an 
evolutionary approach to economics.  
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Schumpeter’s  system  insofar  as  Schumpeter  generally  used  the  terms  stationary  and 
evolutionary on the level of subject matter, not on methodical level.
15,16 It keeps, however, its 
general  structure  and  methodological  outlook.  In  terms  of  the  three-area  structure  of 
Schumpeter’s  system,  of  statics,  dynamics,  and  economic  sociology,  as  worked  out  by 
Shionoya (1997), statics (in Schumpeter’s early sense) corresponds to the stationary part and 
the combination of dynamics (in his early sense) and economic sociology to the evolutionary 
part.
17  
However, as comparative-analytic approaches, such as comparative statics and comparative 
dynamics, but also (modern) dynamics can analyse certain features, or mechanisms, of the 
evolving  economy  (without  addressing  the  ‘process  itself’),  modern  statics  and  dynamics 
together with comparative-analytic approaches cannot be equated with the stationary part of 
Schumpeter’s analytical system. Thus, they do not fit in the classification of his analytical 
system into a stationary and an evolutionary part. Therefore, from a modern perspective, in 
line with Schumpeter’s notions of economic evolution in the wider and the narrower sense, 
for the sake of the further discussion in addition two kinds of evolutionary analysis shall be 
distinguished. The relatively open way of substantially analysing the ‘process itself’ in the 
areas of dynamics (in his early sense) and economic sociology shall be designated in the 
following as an evolutionary analysis in the narrower sense. Evolutionary analysis in the 
wider  sense  shall  be  defined  as  an  analysis  which  adds  up  the  different  approaches  to 
economic analysis contained in Schumpeter’s analytical system in a mutually fruitful way in 
order to study the evolving economy in an encompassing manner. 
 
                                                            
15  With  respect  to  ‘evolutionary’  notably  one  exception  can  be  found  in  the  beginning  of  his  chapter  on 
“Evolutionism” where he seems to apply it on analytical level: “Social phenomena constitute a unique process in 
historic time, and incessant and irreversible change is their most obvious characteristic. If by Evolutionism we 
mean  not  more  than  recognition  of  this  fact,  then  all  reasoning  about  social  phenomena  must  be  either 
evolutionary in itself or else bear upon evolution” (Schumpeter 1954: 435, emphasis added). 
16 It shall be noted that Shionoya, though not in contradiction with Schumpeter’s notion, does generally not 
follow Schumpeter’s terminology concerning ‘evolutionary.’ He rather uses the term to designate economic 
sociology as an “evolutionary science” (Shionoya 1997: 199, ch. 9). He comments on his usage only in one place 
in a footnote where he refers to the institutionalist R. A. Gordon (1964: 124-125) as the source of his connotation 
who had summarized the notion of institutional economics with the following words (as quoted in Shionoya 
1997:  323):  “Economic  behavior  is  strongly  conditioned  by  the  institutional  environment  (in  all  its 
manifestations)  within  which  economic  activity  takes  place,  and  economic  behavior  in  turn  affects  the 
institutional environment. This process of mutual interaction is an evolutionary one. The environment changes, 
and, as it does, so do the determinants of economic behavior. Hence the need for an ‘evolutionary approach’ to 
economics.” 
17 The combination of the two latter fields can be justified with respect to general problems of demarcation 
between them pointed out by Georgescu-Roegen, which will be treated below.  
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2.3 Unsettled issues of Schumpeter’s methodology 
Before  turning  to  Georgescu-Roegen’s  methodological  reasoning,  three  problems  shall  be 
pointed out which Georgescu-Roegen saw and on which he later elaborated.
18 With their close 
relation to the issue of qualitative change or issues directly related to its analysis will be dealt 
below. 
 
2.3.1 Scientific reasons for the non-stationarity of the economic process 
The description of the subject matter is at the basis of each research area in Schumpeter’s 
analytical system. Of a particular importance within his system is the distinction between the 
stationary and the evolutionary economy. While he describes the stationary state as treated in 
his system as a “methodological fiction,” he takes the evolutionary nature of the economic 
process as a basic ontological fact (e.g. Schumpeter 1954: 964). His arguments in support of 
the non-stationarity of the economic process are, however, mainly based on his own common-
sense observation of everyday business, the economy, or economic history (e.g. Schumpeter 
1934: ch. 2, 1939: 36-37, 1950: 83). He does not go beyond seeking, e.g., to provide scientific 
reasons in support of the omnipresence of qualitative change in the economic process. 
 
2.3.2 Exact reasons for the reduced role of mathematical methods in the evolutionary part 
The evolving economy has been described as the analytical object of the evolutionary part of 
his analytical system. In contrast to his static analysis, Schumpeter saw for it in addition to 
theory  history  supplemented  by  statistics  and  institutional  analysis  as  the  appropriate 
analytical techniques. As indicated above, this points to a reduced role for theory and, hence, 
for  the  application  of  mathematical  methods  in  evolutionary  analysis  as  compared  to  his 
statics. He does, however, not come up with exact reasons for that. 
 
2.3.3 The clear distinction between economic and non-economic aspects 
In all of the three research areas which may be distinguished for his work, statics, dynamics, 
and economic sociology, Schumpeter started for the explanation of their respective analytical 
issue – the equilibrium, economic development, and sociocultural development – from the 
assumption  that  there  may  be  a  clear  distinction  between  economic  and  non-economic 
elements.  This  applies,  hence,  in  particular  to  the  case  of  the  explanation  of  economic 
development ‘from within’ the economy in the area of dynamics. Due to the similar status of 
                                                            
18 Of course, from a philosophy-of-science perspective much more could be said on Schumpeter’s analytical 
approach, cf. e.g, only, Shionoya (1997: ch. 5).  
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this assumption for theoretical explanation in the three areas, only the case of equilibrium 
shall be briefly considered more closely. 
It was stated above that Schumpeter generally started from a holistic view on the level of 
subject matter. He continues then, in the beginning of Entwicklung, to describe it as the task 
of the ‘classifying hand of the investigator to artificially extract economic facts out of the 
great stream of the social process.’ He notes that the “designation of  a fact as  economic 
already  involves  an  abstraction”  and  a  “fact  is  never  exclusively  or  purely  economic.” 
Concerning the determination of an equilibrium he states, however: 
 
When we succeed in finding a definite causal relation between two phenomena, our problem is solved if the one 
which plays the “causal” rôle is non-economic. We have then accomplished what we, as economists, are capable 
of in the case in question, and we must give place to other disciplines. If on the other hand, the causal factor is 




Notably because of his aforementioned hints such a proceeding requires a clear criterion to 
distinguish  between  economic  and  non-economic  aspects.  Its  absence  occurs  as  a  serious 
weakness of his theoretical approach. 
 
 
3  Consequences for economic methodology 
This section reviews and puts in perspective a number of Georgescu-Roegen’s contributions 
on methodological issues. It is intended to show, first, how he responded to, elaborated on, 
but  also  went  beyond  Schumpeterian  themes,  second,  how  he  tried  to  improve  the 
Schumpeterian system by that. A particular contribution of his later work, especially in The 
Entropy  Law  and  the  Economic  Process  (1971),  is  an  encompassing  evaluation  of  the 
‘entropy law,’ the second law of thermodynamics, for economics, which constitutes the main 
reference  in  this  section.  Section  3.1  introduces  to  Georgescu-Roegen’s  methodology  and 
considers  the  significance  the  entropy  law  has  in  it.  Section  3.2  presents  two  general 
contributions  of  his  concerning  scientific  analysis  in  the  light  of  the  quality-quantity 
relationship  and  considers  the  methodological  conclusions  he  derived  from  them  for 
economic  analysis.  Section  3.3  briefly  considers  how  he  went  beyond  the  scope  of  his 
teacher’s analysis in his bioeconomics. 
 
  
                                                            
19 Cf. also Shionoya (1997: 36-37). It is to be noted that Shionoya (1997: 101, 116, 315-316) denies, with 
reference to Schumpeter’s first book Wesen (1908) to which Schumpeter also refers on the same pages, that 
Schumpeter actually aimed at a causal explanation as it could be suggested at this place. Still, Schumpeter’s 
definition seems to differ from the equilibrium-of-forces as usual in modern economics.  
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3.1 Qualitative change as a fundamental characteristic of the economic process 
Georgescu-Roegen shared with Schumpeter the encompassing vision of the subject matter of 
economics as well as the pervasive methodological preoccupation.
20 He did, however, not 
develop an encompassing analytical system but generally rather focussed on many single, 
often rather technical points. The following brief introduction to his methodology points in 
particular  to  the  bivalent  character  of  his  reflection  of  the  entropy  law  and  to  its  close 
structural similarity to the Schumpeterian methodology. Furthermore, his direct application of 
the entropy law on the level of subject matter is considered. 
 
3.1.1 General traits of Georgescu-Roegen’s methodology 
Georgescu-Roegen  (1992:  130)  describes  as  his  main  methodological  concern  “the  valid 
analytical representations of the relations among facts.” The task deriving from this objective 
devides for him into two parts. The first part is to clarify the fundamental facts from which 
economics  starts  with  respect  to  scientific,  in  particular  physical,  and  philosophical 
knowledge. The second part constitutes in considering the methodical, methodological, and 
theoretical implications which derive in the light these facts for economic analysis.  
A main intention of his with regard to the first part is to prove that “the economic process is 
not a mechanical phenomenon” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 139). For him, this comes to the 
same as to prove that qualitative, or evolutionary, change is an omnipresent phenomenon in 
the economic process.
21 The second part of the task mainly concerns the implications for an 
economic analysis that is to substantially deal with qualitative change and, in particular, aims 
at its explanation.
22  
For the two parts of the task, the entropy law, as a physical law, constitutes both an important 
reference and a good vehicle. Its evaluation in Entropy Law is, accordingly, situated on two 
levels.  First,  starting  from  the  physical  level,  he  considers  its  direct  physical  and  its 
                                                            
20 Coming from mathematics and statistics, Georgescu-Roegen had studied with Schumpeter in Harvard during 
three years in the mid-1930s. On his influence, Georgescu-Roegen (1992: 130) states: “Every single one of his 
distinctive remarks were seeds that inspired my later works. In this way Schumpeter turned me into an economist 
– the only true Schumpeterian, I believe. My only degree in economics is from Universitas Schumpeteriana.” 
Given  the  many  interpretations  to  which  Schumpeter’s  work  has  laid,  his  claim  to  be  ‘the  only  true’ 
Schumpeterian is certainly to be questioned. 
21 Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 320) encapsulates his basic stance and relates it to the second part of the task: 
“Evolutionary  elements  predominate  in  every  concrete  economic  phenomenon  of  some  significance  –  to  a 
greater extent than even in biology. If our scientific net lets these elements slip through it, we are left only with a 
shadow of the concrete phenomenon.” 
22 Georgescu-Roegen’s main intention by proving the non-mechanical nature of the economic process was, in 
fact, to disprove the possibility of economics as a theoretical science (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 322-330). The 
proof of a necessary link between the qualitative change on physical level and qualitatively changing economic 
structure on phenomenological level is, as far as I see, not contained in Georgescu-Roegen (1971). He generally 
rather  takes  qualitative  change  on  phenomenological  level  for  granted  referring  back  to  Schumpeter  (e.g. 
Georgescu-Roegen 1979: 321).  
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consequent ontological implications for the economic process. Second, on epistemological 
level, he refers to it – as an ‘evolutionary law’
23 – mainly as an illustrating device to discuss 
the intricacies of economic analysis in the presence of qualitative change.  
 
3.1.2 Relationship to Schumpeter’s methodology 
In  the  light  of  the  above  presentation  of  Schumpeter’s  methodology,  it  is  obvious  that 
Georgescu-Roegen’s  two-level  evaluation  of  the  entropy  law,  on  the  physical  and  the 
epistemological level, is exactly in vein with his teacher’s analytical distinction between the 
levels of subject matter and method. Furthermore, there is a striking correspondence between 
Georgescu-Roegen’s striving for ‘valid analytical representation’ and Schumpeter’s search for 
an appropriate correspondence between them. It will become apparent below, however, that 
the two authors differed with respect to the consequences of this latter point for economic 
methodology. In the following, first Georgescu-Roegen’s physical evaluation of the entropy 
law for the economic process and his ontological conclusion are considered. 
 
3.1.3 The significance of the entropy law for the economic process 
According to the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy of a system, i.e. that share of its 
total  energy  which  is  ‘not  useful’  anymore,  tends  to  increase  in  any  isolated  system.
24 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) points out that any increase of entropy is, by definition, related to 
some kind of qualitative change, notably, roughly speaking, by the transformation of ‘useful’ 
into ‘useless’ energy. Thus, any entropy-generating, or entropic, process is at a basic physical 
level fundamentally related to some kind of qualitative change. As all life and life-sustaining 
processes are, however, with respect to any isolated system considered around them, entropic 
processes, in particular, also the economic process is an entropic process. This does not only 
mean that any kind of economic production necessarily relies upon an input of material and 
energetic natural resources to which in sum a lower level of entropy is attached than to the set 
                                                            
23 Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 128) defines an evolutionary law as a proposition which describes an ordinally 
measurable variable Et of a given system. It states that if Et1 < Et2 (Et2 follows Et1 in the ordinal pattern of E), 
then the observation of Et2 is later in time than Et1, and conversely (see also Beard and Lozada 1999: 33). 
24 An isolated system does not exchange energy or matter with its environment, ‘not useful’ means that the 
energy  cannot  be  transformed  into  mechanical  work  any  more.  Of  course,  these  are  only  very  popular 
indications.  For  introductions  to  thermodynamics  for  economists  see  Beard  and  Lozada  (1999:  ch.  5)  or 
Baumgärtner (2000: ch. 3). Georgescu-Roegen’s treatment of thermodynamics contains a series of difficulties 
that  have  been  thoroughly  worked  through  in  the  last  years.  Especially,  he  rejected  the  interpretation  of 
thermodynamics of statistical mechanics and only relied on classical thermodynamics, and postulated a forth law 
of thermodynamics according to which in any (materially) closed system the material entropy tends to increase. 
Though the latter is true for many real world processes, it cannot count as a natural law (cf., for treatments of 
these issues, Beard and Lozada 1999: ch. 6, Faber et al. 1996: ch. 6). With respect to economic methodology, 




of all end products. It implies furthermore – responding to 2.3.1 – that already at a basic 
physical level, the economic process is fundamentally characterized by qualitative change. 
 
3.2 The quality-quantity relationship and economic analysis 
Given the overwhelming importance of qualitative change in the economic process and the 
mathematical character of economic analysis, Georgescu-Roegen was particularly concerned 
with the consistent treatment of the relationship between quality and quantity in economic 
analysis. In this section, first two general contributions of his are introduced which occupy an 
important  place  at  the  basis  of  his  argument.  The  first  one  is  his  consideration  of  the 
possibility, and determination of different degrees, of measurability, the second his distinction 
between arithmomorphic and dialectical concepts as two categories of concepts upon which 
all  sciences  necessarily  rely.  Finally,  the  conclusions  deriving  from  them  for  economic 
analysis as well as his methodical suggestions are considered. 
 
3.2.1 The measurability issue and arithmomorphic and ‘dialectical’ concepts 
Striving  for  a  ‘valid  analytical  representation,’  Georgescu-Roegen  investigated  in  a 
fundamental  manner  the  possibilities  of  measurement  and  the  nature  of  the  concepts 
economics deals with. He emphasized that quality always precedes quantity. His stress of the 
limits of arithmomorphic representation, however, went together with the expression of its 
necessity: “there is a limit to what we can do with numbers, as there is to what we can do 
without them” (Georgescu-Roegen [1958] 1966: 275, 1971: 94).
25 The issue of measurability 
arises in any study that aims at a meaningful quantitative analysis. In this context, Georgescu-
Roegen felt it necessary to precise the established notions of cardinal and ordinal, defining the 
three categories of cardinal, weakly cardinal and purely ordinal measurability.
26 He describes 
ordinal measurability, which means the assignment of ranking numbers to things considered, 
as the most basic of these categories, for the possibility of ranking consitutes the precondition 
of  any  kind  of  measurement.  Cardinal  measurability  presupposes  furthermore,  in  a  strict 
sense, that the entity to be measured is physically indifferently subsumable and subtractable. 
                                                            
25 His general stance can be seen from the first lines of his 1964 article “Measure, Quality, and Optimum Scale”: 
“It is difficult to contemplate the evolution of the economic science over the last hundred years without reaching 
the conclusion that its mathematization was a rather hurried job. [… M]any epistemological issues, which ought 
to have been clarified before any attempt at using the new tools for the old tasks were ignored or avowedly by-
passed. The most important of these issues is that of the relation between quality and quantity. [… Q]uality is 
our most basic concept. It is definitely prior to that of quantity, for before we can speak of a measure of A 
relative to B we must distinguish between A and B in some way or other. And as we do not yet have a measure 
of A this way can be but qualitative” (Georgescu-Roegen [1964] 1976: 271). 
26 Georgescu-Roegen (1964) contains his definite axiomatic analysis of the issue. The following brief account is 
based on the verbal exposition in Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 97-101).  
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This means that neither the mixing of two quanta of the same entity nor the separation of one 
quantum from a reservoir of it results in a qualitative change of the entity itself.
27 If, however, 
mixing or separation are connected to a qualitative variation, there is no cardinal measure for 
that entity. For ordinal attributes, such as chronological time, which is necessarily directed, or 
heat, which at first only constitutes a sense experience, there may be an indirect instrumental 
measure available, such as a mechanical clock or a thermometre, respectively. Georgescu-
Roegen calls this kind of measurability of ordinal attributes weakly cardinal. If there is no 
such indirect possibility for measurement, an ordinal measure  remains  in his terminology 
purely ordinal. 
A particular difficulty constitutes measurement in the case of many economically relevant 
magnitudes, such as e.g. utility and welfare, and in the case of phenomena of the mind, such 
as the mind itself, conciousness, trust, intelligence, knowledge, ignorance. Wondering about 
the general problem related to this kind of concepts, Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 43-47) states 
that  these  entities  do  not  share  the  property,  particularly  evident  in  the  case  of  the  real 
numbers, to be discretely distinct. Rather they are surrounded by penumbras in which their 
meaning overlaps with that of their opposites. Examples are, apart from the phenomena of the 
mind, a man at a certain age who may both count as young and as old, a nation which in a 
particular historical moment may be described both as a democracy and as a non-democracy, 
concepts such as good, justice, likelihood, want, etc. Georgescu-Roegen calls these concepts 
which are not limited by an arithmomorphic boundary ‘dialectical’
28 concepts. By contrast, he 
calls concepts which are discretely distinct, such as the real numbers, or regular geometric 
forms, arithmomorphic concepts. It is evident that there are only few actual arithmomorphic 
concepts, similarly also only few entities with a cardinal or a meaningful weakly cardinal 
measure in his sense. He points out that ‘dialectical’ concepts are not only indispensible in life 
but that all sciences necessarily rely upon dealing with them. Georgescu-Roegen (1971: ch. 3) 
shows  that,  especially,  all  concepts  which  relate  to  qualitative  change  are  necessarily 
‘dialectical’ (in his sense) in character, for neither qualitative change nor a quality itself can 
be fully represented by an arithmomorphic scheme.  
 
 
                                                            
27 Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971: 98) example is water: “[B]y a physical operation independent of any measure we 
can subsume a glass of water and a cup of water or take out a cup of water from a pitcher of water. In both cases 
the result is an instance of the same entity, ‘water.’” 
28 Georgescu-Roegen takes this term, by lack of alternative, from Hegel but continuously emphasizes that his 
notion is differs from Hegel’s (e.g. Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 42, 337). It is to be noted that his use of the term is 
purely methodological in character. It abstracts, hence, from any theoretical or explicative connotation e.g. in 
terms of a development in dialectical progession towards the better.  
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3.2.2 The economic process as a ‘dialectical’ concept and its implications 
Georgescu-Roegen points out that this latter insight applies in particular, due to its definition, 
to the concept of evolution, and thus, due to its evolutionary character, also to the economic 
process.  This  has  implications  for  economic  analysis  in  general  and  an  evolutionary 
theorizing in particular responding to the issues raised in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 
First, while Georgescu-Roegen generally expressed a high esteem as regards mathematical 
analysis and the application of quantitative methods in economics, his concern was with their 
limits: 
 
Since evolutionary phenomena cannot be represented by an analytical model, all evolutionary domains confront 
the student with a difficulty of which we do not seem to be aware. […] The usefulness of the analytical models 
that represent similes of actual processes (divested, however, of any qualitative change) cannot be denied. But 
what matters most in the case of evolutionary structures is the emergence of novelties, of qualitative changes. 
For these aspects we have no other solution than that of a dialectical approach, involving in particular structural 
changes. This means to use words, instead of numbers, for truly qualitative change cannot be represented by an 
arithmomorphic model. Qualities are not preordered, as numbers are, by their own special nature. The most 
relevant part of history is a story told in words, even when it is accompanied by some time series that mark the 
passage of time.  (Georgescu-Roegen 1979: 324-325, emphasis added) 
 
His argument applies obviously directly to the evolutionary part of Schumpeter’s system. 
Thus – responding to 2.3.3 – it is the qualitative change basically connected to evolution 
which  limits  the  scope  for  a  valid  application  of  mathematical  methods  if  it  is  to  be 
substantially integrated into economic analysis. 
A  second  set  of  implications  is  situated  on  theoretical  level  and  applies  especially  to 
Schumpeter’s attempt to explain economic change in his theory of economic development. 
Given that the economic process is ‘dialectical’ in character, Georgescu-Roegen (1971: 317) 
points out that, in general, there cannot be a clear separation between economic and non-
economic  aspects.  Though  not  explicitly  stated  at  this  place,  a  direct  implication  of  this 
observation is then, in particular, that the idea of a theory of economic development with an 
‘endogenous’ explanation of economic change which tries to restrict itself to solely economic 
causes, like Schumpeter’s theory of economic development, is, to say the least, arbitrary. The 
insight  holds  for  any  conceivable  kind  of  domain-specific  evolution.  In  order  to  add 
clarification  to  this  point,  Georgescu-Roegen  (1971:  316-322)  explicitly  discusses  the 
boundaries  of  the  economic  process.  Rather  than  determining  a  neat  demarcation  of  the 
economy, his considerations finally end in a general description of the scope of economics. In 
order to determine the boundaries of the economic process, he refers to Marshall’s definition 
of economics as the “study of mankind in the ordinary business of life.” This determination 
constitutes  in  fact  another  indication  of  the  encompassing  vision  of  the  subject  matter  of 




3.2.3 Methodical suggestions 
While  Georgescu-Roegen  made  many  clarifying  contributions  to  economics,  in  particular 
stating problems and limitations of different analytical approaches, his suggestions how the 
‘‘dialectical’  approach  using  mainly  words’  should  look  like  more  generally  remained, 
notably as compared to Schumpeter’s encompassing system, surprisingly weak. In his own 
research, notably his historical and institutional studies e.g. concerning agrarian economies 
and  their  institutions  but  also  in  his  bioeconomic  analysis,  he  usually  closely  kept  to  his 
standards (Beard and Lozada 1999: 134, Heinzel 2001). In production theory, he made an 
important conceptual contribution with his flow-fund model which accounts for the different 
ways in which different factors take part in the production process and offers a scheme for its 
thermodynamically  complete  representation.  In  general,  however,  he  interestingly  mostly 
recommended to stay with Schumpeter:  
 
I would be among the last servants of science to deny the indispensible role of theory, which must necessarily 
aspire to be quantitative and hence mathematical, provided “theory” is not separated completely from fact. But, 
as my old master Joseph Schumpeter did so poignantly, I would also be among the first to defend the absolute 
necessity of historical and institutional studies in social science, hence in economics.  (Georgescu-Roegen 1976: 
xi) 
 
3.3 Beyond Schumpeter: bioeconomics 
In connection with an evaluation of Georgescu-Roegen’s contribution to the foundations of an 
evolutionary analysis, it is to be mentioned that for him from his biophysical analysis of the 
economic process a series of further implications derived, not only on methodical, but also 
thematic  and  normative  level.  They  led  him  in  an  important  way  beyond  the  scope  of 
Schumpeterian themes. He tried to encapsulate them in his bioeconomic research programme 
which he developed over all of his later work, most explicitly, however, only after Entropy 
Law.
29 It was to combine economics, physics, biology, sociology, and political science in an 
integrative  approach  studying  man’s  biological  struggle  for  existence  (Beard  and  Lozada 
1999: 40-41). His main motivation was a strong normative concern about the finiteness and 
increasing degradation of natural resources and their potential for social conflict. In order to 
solve  the  bioeconomic  problem  of  mankind  he  demanded  changes  in  politics,  economic 
behaviour, and especially in human values. Apart from its normative flavour, his approach 
suffered, however, from the basic reference to his – flawed – postulate of a forth law of 
thermodynamics which was to state the necessary tendency of material entropy to increase in 
any materially closed system.
30  
                                                            
29 Cf. e.g. Georgescu-Roegen (1975, 1978). For a coherent treatment, see Beard and Lozada (1999: 40-43, ch. 7) 
to which the present remarks refer. 
30 Cf. note 26 above.  
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While  his  bioeconomic  programme  remained  ultimately  unfinished,  it  has  found  its 
continuation since the end of the 1980s in a refined way in the area of ecological economics 
(e.g. Costanza 1991, Faber et al. 1996, Mayumi 2001). Ecological economics tries to combine 
especially  ecology,  as  a  natural-science  discipline,  and  economics,  as  a  social-science 
discipline, in an inter- or transdisciplinary approach. On scientific level, the focus shifted 
from the entropy problem towards environmental problems, particularly of a global and long-
run kind, and to development problems, on normative level to the issue of sustainability.  
Ecological economists, such as Daly (1995) or Cleveland and Ruth (1997), have stressed the 
fundamental  change  of  pre-analytic  vision  related  to  Georgescu-Roegen’s  biophysical 
analysis  of  the  economic  process.  While  economics  has  usually  been  treating  the  natural 
environment, if at all, mostly as another resource for economic activity, now the economy 
occurs  as  a  subsystem  of  nature  depending  on  it  physically  and  in  particular  in  terms  of 
constraining  biophysical  limits.  It  is  clear  that  both  nature,  as  a  restraining  and  potential 
factor, and the ecological problem as well as the problem of (under-)development are closely 
related to the issue of economic development, in particular in the long-run. Neither had these 
issues already been on Schumpeter’s agenda, nor are they focus areas of modern evolutionary 
economics thus far. 
 
 
4  Economic analysis with qualitative change taken into account – a  synopsis attempted 
In sections 2 and 3, the methodological approaches of Schumpeter and Georgescu-Roegen 
have been reconsidered pointing in particular to their close relationship with respect to the 
general approach, basic notions as well as certain specific questions Georgescu-Roegen took 
up  from  Schumpeter  and  elaborated  on.  In  the  following  synopsis,  first,  in  section  4.1, 
evolutionary analysis in the narrower sense as defined above on the basis of Schumpeter’s 
analytical system is compared to the usual modern neoclassical methodology. In section 4.2, 
Georgescu-Roegen’s  contribution  is  summarized  with  special  regard  to  complementarities 
and  differences  to  Schumpeter’s  evolutionary  methodology.  Section  4.3  discusses  their 
combined contributions to the foundations of an evolutionary analysis in economics. 
 
4.1 Evolutionary analysis as distinguished from modern statics and dynamics 
Schumpeter developed his analytical system according to his claim to study the economy, and 
thus the economic process, in an encompassing manner. He pointed to qualitative change as 
the basic characteristic of evolution and to the interplay of stationary and evolutionary factors 
(in the economy) to bring about (economic) evolution. With statics in his early sense, modern  
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statics  and  dynamics  had  a  particular  and  fix  place  in  Schumpeter’s  analytical  system. 
However, his conception of equilibrium economics differs in some important respects from 
the modern neoclassical methodology.
31  
Two particular differences are, first, his characteristic analytical separation of method and 
subject matter and, second, the choice of the level of subject matter as the basic reference in 
his analytical system. A fundamental distinction he makes on the level of subject matter is 
that  between  the  stationary  and  the  evolutionary  economy.  While  he  first  describes  the 
stationary economy as the analytical object of his statics, and thus equilibrium economics, he 
later – while still holding that modern statics and dynamics basically refer to the stationary 
economy – admits that (modern) dynamics as well as comparative-analytic approaches can 
also  analyse  aspects  of  mechanism  of  the  evolving  economy.  Schumpeter  complains, 
however, that these approaches do not analyse the ‘process itself’ in a more comprehensive 
way, i.e. that they do not analyse qualitative transformations in a substantial manner. It is 
therefore that he feels necessary to add to the spectrum of economic analysis with dynamics 
(in his early sense) and economic sociology two further fields, which go beyond the modern 
neoclassical methodology. Their combination was defined above to constitute evolutionary 
analysis in the narrower sense. 
To his enlarged perception of the scope of economic analysis corresponds the enlarged set of 
analytical  methods  he  describes.  To  the  methods  of  ‘theory’,  i.e.  formal,  mathematical 
theorizing, and econometrics as the two techniques mostly used today, he adds history and 
institutional analysis. While he assigned theory as the only analytical technique to his early 
statics – today, as noted above, to be complemented by econometrics as a set of empirical 
techniques – he sees history and institutional analysis as necessary additional methods in the 
fields of dynamics (in his early sense) and economic sociology. Thus, for an analysis that 
substantially takes into account the evolutionary character of the economic process, or an 
evolutionary analysis in the narrower sense, he sees the full set of analytical techniques – 
theory, history, statistics, and institutional analysis – as necessary and, at the same time, a 
reduced role for formal mathematical theory.  
Equilibrium economics constituted for Schumpeter a necessary part within his larger vision of 
the scope and methods of economic analysis. Though, as he stated himself, it could not be 
equated to the stationary part of his system, he regarded it as valid with regard to certain 
research questions, especially concerning the stationary economy. It was thus also subject to 
his basic reference to the level of subject matter and to his instrumentalist stance concerning 
the use of the different methods. In this way, it was embedded in his larger conception of 
                                                            
31 Cf. e.g. Blaug (1992) for a treatment of the neoclassical methodology.  
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economic analysis and a constituent part of an evolutionary analysis in the wider sense of the 
whole of his analytical system, as defined above. 
In  sum,  Schumpeter’s  approach  to  economic  analysis  mainly  differs  from  the  modern 
neoclassical methodology (i) in its analytical separation of method and subject matter and its 
emphasis on the level of subject matter as the basic reference for analytical proceeding, (ii) in 
the enlarged scope of economic analysis by the fields of dynamics (in Schumpeter’s early 
sense) and economic sociology, (iii) in the enlarged box of tools by the methods of history 
and institutional analysis to cope with the (economic) process itself, and (iv) in the consistent 
instrumentalist  stance  concerning  the  application  of  analytical  techniques  for  different 
analytical purposes. As the central analytical issue of evolutionary analysis in the narrower 
sense, thus of dynamics (in his early sense) and economic sociology, he describes qualitative 
change
32 as occurring in the economy. Further, due to its claim for an encompassing analysis 
of the economy and its emphasis on the evolutionary character of the economic process, the 
whole of Schumpeter’s system can be considered as describing evolutionary analysis in the 
wider sense. 
 
4.2 Georgescu-Roegen’s contribution – complementarities and differences 
The above review showed that Georgescu-Roegen’s methodological contributions, as far as 
corresponding to Schumpeter, mainly refer to the evolutionary part of Schumpeter’s analytical 
system. Following Schumpeter’s dichotomy of subject matter and method, his first intention 
is to show on the level of subject matter, with reference to the entropy law, that qualitative 
change is an omnipresent phenomenon in the economic process already on the physical level. 
In view of a valid analytical representation, his focus is then, on epistemological level, on the 
methodical, methodological and theoretical problems of the treatment of qualitative change. A 
fundamental  result  of  his  epistemological  considerations  is  that  the  economic  process 
constitutes  a  ‘dialectical’  concept.  Thus,  the  economic  process  shares  the  property  of,  in 
particular, all entities that undergo qualitative transformations, such as all evolving structures, 
that  it  cannot  be  fully  represented  by  an  arithmomorphic  scheme.  With  respect  to 
Schumpeter’s theoretical and analytical approach, his statement has important implications.  
Due  to  the  ‘dialectical’  character  of  the  economic  process,  there  is,  in  general,  no  clear 
distinction between economic and non-economic aspects. The same holds for the demarcation 
of  any  other  social  or  scientific  domain.  This  questions  the  respective  precondition  of 
Schumpeter’s  theoretical  explanation  of  equilibrium,  economic  development  and 
                                                            




sociocultural development. Given that there is no clear demarcation between the economic 
process and the rest of the social process, Schumpeter’s analytical distinction between an 
explanatory  mode  which  solely  concentrates  on  economic  factors  (such  as  his  theory  of 
economic development) and one which refers to the economic process as a part of the larger 
sociocultural development – i.e. his analytical distinction between the areas of dynamics (in 
his early sense) and economic sociology – occurs as a largely artificial one. It is therefore that 
when combining the two fields to define evolutionary analysis in the narrower sense above it 
was abstracted from this distinction. Hence, according to this reasoning the actual explanation 
of economic development requires, in general, also the reference to factors from the social 
process other than economic ones. Georgescu-Roegen’s biophysical analysis of the economic 
process makes furthermore aware of the mutual additional importance natural factors may 
have.  
Apart from the methodological and theoretical implications, his reasoning allows Georgescu-
Roegen  further  to  substantiate  Schumpeter’s  intuitive  determination  of  the  appropriate 
methods for a substantial analysis of economic evolution, or an evolutionary analysis in the 
narrower sense. The analytical inclusion of qualitative change necessarily implies a reduced 
role of mathematical and quantitative methods on the one hand, and an increased importance 
of ‘dialectical’ approaches, such as the Schumpeterian techniques of history and institutional 
analysis,  on  the  other.  It  is  therefore  that  an  evolutionary  analysis  in  the  narrower  sense 
necessarily has to apply a varied set of methods compared to modern statics and dynamics.  
An important difference between Georgescu-Roegen and Schumpeter concerns their attitude 
towards  the  realism  of  theories.  In  contrast  to  Schumpeter’s  instrumentalist  stance,  for 
Georgescu-Roegen  there  could  only  be  a  substantive,  i.e.  most  realist,  theorizing  and, 
especially,  modeling.  Therefore,  compared  to  Schumpeter’s  analytical  system  he  saw 
generally  less  room  for  (formal)  theorizing  and,  in  a  strict  sense,  he  saw  no  room  for  a 
symbolic or conceptual modeling. From the same reason his special interest for the issue of 
the evolutionary part of Schumpeter’s analytical system derived. 
 
4.3  Combining  Schumpeter’s  and  Georgescu-Roegen’s  contributions:  the  unresolved 
theoretical problem 
It was noted above that while Schumpeter set the basic issue and provided an encompassing 
analytical  system  for  the  study  of  the  evolving  economic  process,  Georgescu-Roegen 
elaborated  on  many  single,  often  rather  technical  points.  His  mostly  methodological 
contributions  attempted  to  correct  and  refine  the  Schumpeterian  system  in  different  ways 
mostly concerning its evolutionary part. But they also have more general consequences. In  
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this  section,  their  main  contributions  concerning  the  issue  as  well  as  on  methodical  and 
theoretical level to the foundations of an evolutionary analysis are combined and confronted 
with each other. 
Schumpeter’s  and  Georgescu-Roegen’s  major  concern  was  that  economic  analysis  should 
account for the evolutionary nature of the economic process. They were therefore specially 
concerned with the valid substantial integration of qualitative change, as the central issue of 
an evolutionary analysis, into economic analysis. While Schumpeter states that qualitative 
change  can  occur  at  any  level  of  the  economy,  Georgescu-Roegen  attempts  to  show  in 
addition that, due to thermodynamic reasons, it must even occur by necessity in the economic 
process. However, in Entropy Law he fails to establish the link between this recognition on 
physical level and the respective necessity on economic level. For setting the issue of an 
evolutionary  analysis  Schumpeter’s  common-sense  description  of  the  phenomenon  is 
therefore, up to now, still far more important than Georgescu-Roegen’s thermodynamic proof 
of  the  evolutionary  nature  of  the  economic  process  on  physical  level.  It  is  to  be  noted, 
however, that on thematic level, Georgescu-Roegen’s biophysical analysis of the economic 
process  adds  environmental  and  resource  problems,  and  thus  nature,  to  Schumpeter’s 
analytical scope. 
While on methodical level, Schumpeter only feels that a substantial analysis of the economic 
process necessitates an encompassing analytical system, including also the methods of history 
and institutional analysis and a reduced role of mathematics, Georgescu-Roegen shows that 
the enlarged set of analytical methods and the reduced role of mathematics is but a necessary 
consequence of the inclusion of qualitative change in evolutionary analysis. 
On  theoretical  level,  Schumpeter  tries  to  explain  economic  development  in  his  theory  of 
economic  development  by  solely  referring  to  economic  factors.  By  recognizing  that  all 
evolutionary  entities  are  ‘dialectical’  concepts,  Georgescu-Roegen  proves,  however,  that 
generally  any  attempt  at  a  domain-specific  (substantive)  theory  of  evolution  is  a  priori 
arbitrary. Within Schumpeter’s analytical system, this statement does not only apply to the 
explanatory  mode  at  the  bottom  of  his  theory  of  economic  development  but  also  to  the 
respective preconditions of his equilibrium conception and his explanation of sociocultural 
development.  Georgescu-Roegen’s  biophysical  analysis  of  the  economic  process  points 
furthermore to the fact that natural factors and, related to that, also facts from science can 
have a role to play in the explanation of economic development.  
In sum, tt may therefore be stated that Schumpeter and Georgescu-Roegen set the basic issue 
of  an  evolutionary  analysis  and  provided  a  general  analytical  framework  including  the 
description of a useful set of methods to cope with it. Georgescu-Roegen’s epistemological   
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considerations,  however,  fundamentally  question  the  explanatory  mode  at  the  basis  of 
Schumpeter’s research areas of statics, dynamics and economic sociology. Thus, following 
Georgescu-Roegen’s reasoning, within their combined approach and at the general level of 
the present discussion the general theoretical problem of how to explain qualitative change, 
and,  in  particular,  economic  evolution,  yet  only  how  to  address  qualitative  change  in  a 




5  Relating Schumpeter`s and Georgescu-Roegen’s contributions to modern research 
In this section, a brief outlook on current research is given and some implications from the 
general considerations above for research in modern evolutionary economics are discussed. 
 
5.1 A brief outlook on current research 
A systematic comparison of the methodological characteristics Schumpeter and Georgescu-
Roegen described for an evolutionary analysis on a general level and the methodologies used 
in modern evolutionary economics is beyond the scope of this paper. It shall briefly be noted, 
however, that current methodologies as well as much of the research in modern evolutionary 
economics are in fact in vein with an evolutionary analysis in the narrower sense as described 
above.
33 In fact, the above observation of the unresolved theoretical problem goes together 
with  an  apparent  special  concern  for  theory  prevailing  in  this  field.  This  was  already 
demanded  by  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982:  ch.  2).  In  the  same  place,  they  also  described 
‘appreciative  theorizing’  as  a  useful,  less  formal,  more  verbal  and  qualitive  mode  of 
(evolutionary) theorizing. On methodological level, they further proposed more recently to 
combine history and formal methods in ‘history-friendly models’ (e.g. Malerba et al. 1999, 
2001). Moreover, the integration of heterogeneity and, generally, more ‘structure,’ or quality, 
into the analytical picture as well as the use of more substantial analytical concepts, such as 
e.g.  routine,  technological  trajectory  or  paradigm,  path-dependence,  lock-in/lock-out,  co-
evolution, innovation system, can be seen as efforts to deal with real qualitative change more 
substantially  in  economic  analysis.  Finally,  the  number  of  case  studies  clearly  reflects 
Schumpeter’s and Georgescu-Roegen’s emphasis on historical and institutional studies.  
                                                            
33 E.g. Malerba (2006: 19) states the common research methodology in the Schumpeterian and evolutionary 
tradition as follows: “identify some empirical regularities, stylized facts or puzzles that need to be explained, 
develop appreciative theorizing, do quantitative analyses and then formal modelling. Consistency between case-
appreciative theorizing-econometrics and modelling has to be present. In a sense, research should not be guided 




5.2 Implications for modern research 
Schumpeter’s  and  Georgescu-Roegen’s  considerations  point  to  a  series  of  fundamental 
difficulties which still challenge modern research. All of them can, in fact, be traced to the 
fuzziness of the notion of evolution described by Georgescu-Roegen, and are thus closely 
related to the issue of qualitative change. At this place, four of them shall briefly be stated. 
A first general implication of their reasoning is that in order to capture qualitative change in a 
substantial way, substantive analytical concepts are needed which, in turn, are necessarily 
‘dialectical’. Thus, the problem of demarcation and proper definition applies in particular to 
all of these basic notions, including especially that of evolution (in the economy). Second, on 
theoretical level, the recognition of the fuzziness of the concept of evolution implies that there 
is no purely economic ‘self’ whose transformation could be explained solely with respect to 
economic factors. A consequence of this is, third, that a substantive evolutionary theorizing 
must  necessarily  take  into  account  findings  from  other  disciplines  or  be  in  itself 
interdisciplinary. This implies a series of further difficulties especially on methodological 
level, such as e.g. the definition of adequate scientific standards for an evolutionary analysis, 
which were hardly addressed by Schumpeter or Georgescu-Roegen. Fourth, the ‘dialectical’ 
nature  of  evolution  does  neither  imply  a  clear  focus  of  the  research  questions  guiding 
evolutionary-economic studies nor, in itself, give rise to a systematic analytical approach on 
either methodical or theoretical level. Therefore, the relative openness  and breadth of the 
analytical  categories  discussed  above  constitute  both  a  necessary  characteristic  of,  and  a 
particular challenge for an evolutionary analysis. 
With regard to modern research, it is to be noted that, as much of it is applied, many of the 
issues stated are dealt with in a pragmatic way. However, a theoretical approach to the issue 
of economic evolution that is to substantially reflect economic reality needs to address and to 
solve them, as far as possible. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  Schumpeter’s  original  encompassing  approach  to  economic  analysis  was 
revisited and discussed in view of Georgescu-Roegen’s critical elaboration on it. The two 
objectives  were  (i)  to  work  out  and  discuss  their  contribution  to  the  foundations  of  an 
evolutionary  analysis  in  economics  and  (ii)  to  consider  mutual  complementarities  and 
differences of their approaches. 
Therefore,  the  general  structure  of  Schumpeter’s  analytical  system  and  the  position  and 
importance of qualitative change in it were worked out and his decisive analytical distinction  
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between the levels of subject matter and method pointed out. On the basis of his distinction of 
the stationary and the evolutionary economy on the level of subject matter, a stationary and an 
evolutionary  part  of  his  system  were  distinguished.  Schumpeter  described  the  possible 
occurrence of qualitative change on  all levels  of the economy as the  central issue of the 
evolutionary part of his system. It was shown that modern statics and dynamics, including the 
comparative-analytic approaches, do neither fit in the stationary-evolutionary distinction nor 
fully  cover  the  scope  of  Schumpeter’s  system.  Therefore,  an  evolutionary  analysis  in  the 
narrower sense, analyzing the evolutionary process itself, and an evolutionary analysis in the 
wider  sense,  combining  analytical  elements  of  the  whole  of  his  analytical  system,  were 
defined. It was pointed out that for an evolutionary analysis Schumpeter saw the need to rely 
upon  the  full  spectrum  of  the  analytical  methods  he  distinguished  for  economic  analysis, 
including in particular historical and institutional analyses.  
It  was  then  shown  that  Georgescu-Roegen’s  contributions  exactly  follow  Schumpeter’s 
distinction of subject matter and method and contribute on both levels. Fixing, with reference 
to  the  entropy  law,  qualitative  change  as  a  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  economic 
process,  he  specially  focused  on  the  implications  of  a  substantial  analytical  inclusion  of 
qualitative change. His description of the economic process as a ‘dialectical’ concept (in his 
sense) questions the possibility of a domain-specific theory of economic evolution, such as 
e.g.  attempted  by  Schumpeter’s  theory  of  economic  development.  Moreover,  his  analysis 
showed that an evolutionary analysis in their sense necessarily has to apply a varied set of 
methods  as  compared  to  modern  statics  and  dynamics.  As  an  important  difference, 
Georgescu-Roegen did not follow Schumpeter’s instrumentalist stance on methodical level 
but rather pleaded for a substantial theorizing. 
Combining Schumpeter’s and Georgescu-Roegen’s contributions, it was argued in sum that 
together they did provide an encompassing general framework for the analysis of economic 
evolution  necessarily  different  from,  but  complementary  to  modern  static  and  dynamic 
analysis. The discussion showed, however, that they did neither state nor solve the general 
theoretical problem of an evolutionary analysis in their sense. 
The close relationship between their approach and the modern was pointed out. A series of 
problems their combined approach shows related to the fuzziness of the concept of evolution 
was  stated  which  challenge  still  modern  research.  Thus,  while  modern  evolutionary 
economics can find a number of useful categories and considerations in Schumpeter’s and 
Georgescu-Roegen’s works, their combined contributions also point to a range of particular 
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